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MID·WEST QUARTERLY
Vol. I]

[No.2

JANUARY, 1914

GERMAN ROMANTICISM
Welch ein Unfug I Welch Geschrei I
GOETHE:

Faust.

The German romantic movement was the result of defective
culture, of bodily and mental derangement, of spiritual and
nervous disorder. It is a work of degeneration, deformation, and
disease. And it bears on its front the stigmata of its infirmitiesabsurdity, folly, inanity, and confusion. There is Hardenberg,
the pattern of the school, who falls in love with a chit of thirteen
and at her death a year or so later dedicates himself to the grave,
an unblemished sacrifice of love, unblighted by sickness, violence,
or sorrow, the cheerful victim of his own regret. In the meanwhile he begins a new era and dates his note-books from the
epoch of her decease. By the end of the following twelvemonth,
however, he has sufficiently vaporised his emotions in various
scribblings to choose another bride and is reduced to faking
metaphysical nonsense to pass off an infidelity which would never
have been cast up against him but for his own extravagant protestations. Sophie and Julie are two, such is his magic arithmetic,
only in the land of phenomena; in the land of fulfilment, where
all differences are reconciled, they are but one. There again is
Friedrich Schlegel, grubber of ideas for the whole party, proclaiming in sublime paradox that formlessness is the highest form
of art; the fragment, the consummate genre of literature; the
dissolution of poetic illusion, the signet of poetic genius. Prophet of transcendental buffoonery and irony, of Freiheit and
Willkilr, he has ended his days in the service of the two narrowest
Autoritatsprincipien that ever were, Austrian imperialism and
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Roman Catholicism. There is Tieck too, after an education littfe
better than an emotional and intellectual debauch, writing dramas
backwards and demonstrating the identity of poetry and music
by "transposing" notes into words:
" Die Farbe klingt, die FOliTI ertont."

There is Schleiermacher, the priest, the Geistlicher, preaching
free love and the "emancipation of woman," making himself,
in W alzel's words, "the forerunner of the modem French novel, "
the gospel of lubricity and license. And finally there are poor
H6lderlin and Wackenroder, the one crack-brained at thirty or
thereabouts, the other fretted out at twenty-five between his duty
and his inclinations. Nor are their friends and lovers much
better. On the whole they are pretty much of a piece with
Dorothea Veit, the daughter of Moses Mendelssohn, who deserts
her husband and two children to run after Friedrich Schlegel,
and Caroline Michaelis-Dame Lucifer, Schiller called herBohmer's widow, Gallic agitator, inmate of a German prison,
mother of a nameless child, who accepts Friedrich's brother,
Wilhelm, as a pis aller and under his nose carnes on a liaison
with Schelling, for whom she finally leaves her husband.
I

But enough of personalities. The thoroughly significant thing
about German romanticism as a literary phenomenon is its
sterility. It has almost no works, literally next to nothing to
show for itself in the way of literature. A little vapid verse,
two or three staggering dramas, a few rickety M iirchen and
twaddling rhapsodies, several dilapidated novels, or rather romances, to sustain the claims of a school that pretended to derive
from the Roman-this is just about all its literary capital, the
greater part of it unreadable, inexpressibly childish, silly, and dull.
In itself it were all equally harmless, though for different reasons,
because all equally ineffectual. If there is something almost
disarming about the naivete which could seriously busy itself
with a performance like Heinrich von Ofterdingen, the preposterous
crudity and flatulence of a Sternbald is no less disabling. Both
were alike negligible, had it not been for the impudence of their
exploiters. Indeed, as a general thing the illustrators of the
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movement were not in the first instance responsible; they were
merely let in for it. In its inception the school consisted virtually
of a pair of doctrinaires and theorists-Wilhelm Schlegel, dilettante and eclectic, and his brother, Friedrich, pedant and mauvais
tete-who attempted to create a criticism a priori and who,
impotent to illustrate it themselves, were forced to have recourse
to what they were able to pick up elsewhere. After a fashion
it resembled those institutions which are universities in name
but in fact are nothing but examining boards. It criticised the
productions of others, and if pleased therewith, graduated them
romantic. It lived on foreign conquest and annexation, and made
capital of the fruit of other men's labours. In such wise it
cannily took possession of Tieck, who was at bottom an independent man of letters, a free lance, even a journalist in the
sense that with him literature was before all a business and a
livelihood. In a word Tieck was too much of a Dryden to be a
romanticist by vocation. The significant thing about him is that
he outgrew his romanticism, which in his case was only a malady
of adolescence, a distemper or kind of green sickness. It was
merely one of hi~ manners and no mote permanent or final than
that which marked his period of "enlightenment. "
In particular, however, romanticism found its most advantageous affair in the inadvertencies and indiscretions of acknowledged genius. So it laid· hands upon certain work of Schiller's
and Goethe's, and insisted upon making them romantic leaders
in spite of their protests. To be sure, Goethe was in some sense
romantic and not wholly irresponsible for many of the positions
his name was used to cover. But the capital fact of his life,
after all, was his conversion from romanticism, even after his own
kind, which was at worst of quite another complexion than that
of the school's. What importance he himself attached to this
change of colours, is shown by the circumstance that he is constantly preoccupied with it during the latter part of his lifeendlessly affirming, explaining, justifying, and commenting it.
Unfortunately, however, for a just perception of the facts it is the
romantic Goethe with whom we are better acquainted, partly
on account of the currency which he himself has given his earlier
years in Dichtung und Wahrheit and partly on account of the
assiduity with which the romanticists have continued painting
his portrait after their own likeness. But for all the seduction
of his youth and the apotheosis it has received, the significance
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of his manhood, of his intellectual being, should not be overlooked
-and that was irreconcilably at odds with the romantic error.
And yet it must be acknowledged in the same breath that whatever his principles, Goethe was always inclined to coquette with
romanticism more than was good for him. Personally I fail
to see much choice, as literature, between the second part of
Faust and Tieck's Prinz Zerbino. As a system of philosophy,
metaphysics, or Symbolik the former may be vastly superior;
that is a question to be decided by those who understand it.
But at all events it was by no means difficult for the romanticists
to find in him excuse or precedent for some of their worst follies.
So it was in particular with the gigantic egotism which underlay
their pretensions to artistic vocation. There is something almost
bete in the complacency and open-mouthed stupefaction with
which Goethe--and even Schiller, who had less reason for itcontemplate their own productions, as though they were some
great and inevitable work of nature, to say nothing of the exaggerated respect which they have for their own occupation. And
while perhaps the frequent fatuity of the romanticists was less
innocent as it was less excusable, they might have pointed to this
common trait among others as a plausible evidence of kinship.
Nevertheless the lesson to be drawn from the careers of Goethe
and Tieck as a whole is perfectly obvious. The notions of the
romantic school are, in the most favourable interpretation, those
of youth and immaturity; it is impossible for any sane man to
grow old, not to say ripe, in them. Their very begetters abandoned them in later life--or rather, the other way about, their
ideas abandoned them, and they went out one after another like
draughty candles. Even the two Schlegels became, the one a
functionary of authority and tradition, the other a literary
cicisbeo or factotum. In short, there is .about romanticism
nothing permanent or achieved. It is not a state of attainment
in which it is possible to rest content, as Goethe rested in his
classicism. It is not even a stage of development; it is a mood,
an aberration of spirit, to which youth, together with periods of
dissolution and transition, is particularly liable.
No wonder, then, that the existence of German romanticism
was parasitic; it lacked the constitution to live independently
and relied upon other sources for its sustenance and support.
Hence in part its mischievousness. I t deranged the intellectual
economy and impaired the moral health of the whole age and its
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posterity by disturbing the natural circulation of ideas and stimulating a set of abnormal and artificial appetites and reactions.
The ideas which it appropriated, the work which it approved, were
~eldom their authors' best or sanest. To be sure, there was at the
time little enough that was excellent to choose from; still of
what there was it failed to take the best. Or if by any chance it
did, the reasons for its choice, as well as the use it made of its
selections, were anything but judicious. Naturally its acquisitions were exceptional and accidental when considered with
reference to the entire work of the author from whom they were
extracted; and since they formed no ensemble of themselves,
they were as frequently inconsistent and incongruous one with
another. In this way arose endless difficulties-multiplied
explanations, reconciliations, compromises, adjustments, extenuations-and in general an impression of confusion and inconsequence about the whole ingeniously tessellated fabric. This is
the explanation too of that inextricable mixture of truth and falsehood in the romantic doctrine by which so much that is erroneous
has succeeded in passing current in the past until our criticism
and appreciation are honeycombed with it and by which the
wariest critic is liable to be disconcerted still.
Upon this confusion it was inevitable that the intellectual
sterility peculiar to the movement should react disastrously.
As a matter of fact, the two characters are hardly separable, and
it would be difficult to say whether the romantic confusion is
a result of literary impotence or vice versa. It is merely a case
of action and reaction. Inasmuch as its promoters had few
ideas of their own, they were thriftily disposed to make these
ideas go as far as possible by applying them to all sorts of subjects
indiscriminately. So Friedrich Schlegel transferred to current
criticism the principles he had originally derived from the study
of Greek. He judges Wilhelm Meister by the same criteria as
the Iliad and the Odyssey and arrives, as might be expected, at
an insanely jumbled estimate of both. Nor did the school,
under his able tuition and that of his brother, proceed otherwise
with such general subjects as art, nature, religion, and philosophy,
as though to justify Schleiermacher's saying, "Es gehort zu dem
sich noch immer weiter bildenden Gegensatz der neuen Zeit gegen
die alte, dass nirgend mehr einer eines ist, sondern jeder alles."
So little sense had they of the just measure that they seldom
touched an idea without spraining it. They broke up wholes
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into parts and erected parts into wholes. They isolated single
factors and treated them as complete in themselves. They
mistook means for ends and ends for means. They added and
subtracted unlike denominations to make a desired product.
They slurred distinctions and ignored resemblances. They
invented such hybrids as the" religion of art" and the" religion
of nature, " terms which they took literally, not metaphorically.
" Any man is a priest, " says Schleiermacher, "who under a form
original and complete has developed in himself, to the point of
virtuosity, the faculty of feeling in any mode of representation. "
With Schelling they turned poetry into philosophy and with
Novalis they turned religion into poetry. For the latter, indeed,
the gospels derive their authority chiefly from the fact that they
have to do with the dissolution of a spell (Verzauberung) and hence
resemble a Miirchen or fairy tale, the favourite romantic genre.
In a word, confusion-chaos they themselves define as the romantic element-is, with futility, the constant character of the
movement, and our present universal deformation of ideas is
but an heirloom of the school.
Capital, in particular, for its critical temper is the crass
eclecticism with which it sought to run the arts together, into a
kind of indiscriminate medley, without regard for their natural
differences of aim, effect, material, and method. With the
phenomenon itself we are only too well acquainted nowadays
when our critics are still discoursing as though the Laokoon had
never been written while our poets are industriously creating
pastels in prose and symphonies in verse, to say nothing of the
painters' marvels in tone and the musicians' miracles of colour.
But appalling as it is to observe how quickly a distinction once
achieved may be totally obliterated, it is not we in this case who
are the first offenders. Friedrich Schlegel, N ovalis, Tieck, and
"many more whose names on earth are dark "-they are all with
one accord for the promiscuity of art. "Hence it is desirable
to bring the arts together again and to seek transitions from one
to the others. In this wise statues may rouse into paintings,
paintings become poems, poems music, and who knows what
noble church music will mount once more like a temple into the
air! " So the elder Schlegel; and to much the same effect N ovalis :
" In general it is impossible for the poets to learn enough from the
musicians and painters. . . . They should be more poetic
and as who should say more musical and picturesque." While
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the younger Schlegel in his own very best manner raises distraction to its highest power: "Romantic poetry is a progressive universal poetry. Its mission is not merely to unite all the
sep~rate varieties of poetry and to reconcile poetry with philosophy and rhetoric; it will and must also now blend, now fuse
poetry and prose, genius and criticism, art-poetry and naturepoetry." As for Tieck, it must be acknowledged, he is by no
means so universal a spirit; he is merely an advocate for the
poetry of music and the music of poetry: "What! is it not permissible to think in tones and to make music in words and
thoughts? "
In all these quotations, it should be noticed, the word poetry
has come to have a meaning so vague, shifty, and ambiguous
as to be incapable of supporting any conclusion-or what amounts
to the same thing, as to be capable of supporting any conclusion
whatever, an advantage which Wilhelm Schlegel finally pushes
home in his Berlin lectures on belles-lettres and art by substituting
the term "poetics" for the "theory of art" (K unstlehre) in
general.
All this has a very familiar ring. It is quite in our own wayso much so as to seem rather trite and hardly worth consideration
save for the sake of its genealogy. But then, which of the romanticists' errors is likely to appear novel in the eyes of their heirs?
At the same time I maybe pardoned in the interests of completeness for calling attention to still another obsession and that the
most striking and significant of all. I mean that which at bottom
a disciple of Freud's might be disposed to think responsible for
the whole romantic neurosis. To be sure,. there is ever a disposition at periods of ecstatic agitation to confound love erotic
with love charitable. But in this instance the symptom is
particularly important because what seems to result from a
study of the romantic doctrine of passion, is the suspicion that a
great part of the disorder of the school was the result of nothing
more or less than sexual unrest. The manner in which this
sensual ground of uneasiness appears and reappears at frequent
intervals, like a shoal under ruffled water, is startling.. How much
of Nova1is' piety is due to the loss of his Sophie it is hard to say;
but its kind orjquality is unmistakable-it bears the marks of a
thwarted or perverted desire, a momentary vacancy of the senses.
In his own words, "the exaltation of the beloved object to a
divinity is applied religion." And equally characteristic of the
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confusion between Eros and Charity is the jotting in his notebook, "Christus und Sophie." But it is Schleiermacher in his
Reden ilber die Religion who puts the official and theological
seal upon this notion that" die Losung alter Riitsel im Geheimnis
der Liebe liege."
" For him who stands alone the all exists in vain, for in order to take up
into himself the life of the Universal Spirit (Weltgeist) and to have religion,
man must first have discovered mankind, and that he :finds only in love and
through love. For this reason are the two things so intimately joined; longing for love, ever fulfilled and ever renewed, comes at once to constitute for
him religion. . . . Therefore religion withdraws into the still more confidential intercourse of friendship and the dialogue of love, wherein face
and figure are plainer than words and even a sacred silence is intelligible."

With these tenets it is hardly astonishing that the promoters of
the movement should be, on the whole, so little edifying in their
relations with the sex. One and all they were dominated not by
women but by woman. The gallantry of Wilhelm Schlegel is notorious. For the riotousness of Friedrich his Lucinde is sufficient
evidence, not to mention his early letters to his brother. But why
multiply examples? The lubricity of Ardinghello seems to have
awakened a response in every one of them, even Tieck. And
not only this, which might be paralleled in more robust natures;
about all their love affairs there is invariably something morbid
and uncanny. Caroline was eleven years older than Schelling;
she was thirty-five and he was twenty-four, when he first fell in
love with her. Sophie von Kuhn was a mere child of twelve or
thirteen when betrothed to Hardenberg. I have already spoken
of Wilhelm Schlegel's inglorious conquest of Bohmer's widow after
her experience in Mainz and her political incarceration. He
seems too to have borne with exemplary equanimity her infatuation for Schelling, which took place under his very nose, and to
have accommodated himself to the liaison with a complaisance
in no wise short of ignominious. Even after Dorothea's divorce
from Veit, Friedrich Schlegel insists upon keeping up the irregularity of their relationship as long as possible in sheer delight
apparently in his own depravity. Characteristic too is the wellknown passage of his Lucinde in celebration of the transposition
of the masculine and feminine r6les in love. Schleiermacher
himself must needs fall in love with a married woman to begin
with and finally marry the widow of a friend. But something
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in which they saw their own figures a thousand times repeated
and of colossal dimensions. " M ich fuhrt alles in mich selbst
zuruck," confesses N ovaHs. Or if it failed to admit their pretensions to magnitude, they shut their eyes to it and denied its
competence altogether:
"Ich komme nur mir selbst entgegen
In einer leeren W ustenei. "

As a matter of fact they had all been spoiled in the nursery,
and spoiled children most of them remained all their lives. The
work with which they won a hearing was almost uniformly unfit
for publication; in France it would never have got into print
at all. It was only the abject poverty of German letters at the
time which allowed them to pose as writers, and precocious ones
at that. Tieck's origins are incredibly crude and mawkish.
Friedrich Schlegel's first critical efforts are execrably written and
composed, and reek of intellectual coxcombry and pretension.
Novalis is jejune and silly. The blest of them all is Wilhelm
Schlegel, and he is commonplace and foppish. But finding
themselves indulged in their whimsicalities and mannerisms, and
flattered by their ability to dumbfound the respectable Philistine,
the Nicolais, and other A ufkliirer of the day, they had no incentive
to correct themselves and clarify the ferment of their youth.
And particularly so, since there was no authority capable of
impressing or overawing them. For a graphic picture of the
spiritual conditions at the time as they appeared even to the
romanticists themselves, whose very element was confusion,
I can do no better than quote Schleiermacher:
"It is a time," he says, "when nothing human remains unshaken; when
every one sees just that which determines his place in the world and secures
him to the earthly order, on the point, not only of escaping him and falling into
another's possession, but even of perishing in the universal maelstrom; when
some not only spare no exertion of their own powers but also call for help on
every side in order to keep fast what they consider the axes of the world and
of society, of art and of science, which are by an indescribable fatality upheaving as though of themselves from their deepest foundations and are leaving to
destruction what has revolved about them for so long; when others with restless impetuosity are busy in clearing away the ruins of fallen centuries in order
to be among the first to settle upon the fruitful soil which is forming underneath out of the rapidly cooling lava from the frightful volcano; when every
one, even without leaving his own place, is so greatly agitated by the violent
convulsions of the universe that amid the generai vertigo he must needs
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rejoice to see a single object steadily enough to hold by it and gradually be
able to persuade himself that there is something still standing."

Amid the universal trepidation Goethe and Schiller alone
exercised some sort of steadying influence. But even Goethe
and Schiller, as I have already remarked, were not invariably
level-headed. And by the time the youngsters might have
profited by their better example the mischief was done; they
were confirmed in their folly to the point of resenting criticism
and admonition. They quarrelled with Schiller and even with
Goethe, and consorted only with those like-minded with themselves, "Bruder im Geiste. " From their early corruption, therefore, they never recovered. If they were not thwart and perverse
from the start, they soon became so under the process of deliberate self-cockering and mutual admiration which was the breath
of their life ..
Psychologically their leading motive was egotism. From this
one characteristic it would be possible to derive pretty nearly
their whole activity. "Das Ich soU sein." The self was their
favourite, their exclusive pursuit; Selbst-beobachtung, their darling
study. It is with utter rapture that Schleiermacher describes
the glorious moment when he first discovered his I, unique and
unmatchable--like Childe Roland's dark tower, "without a
counterpart in the whole world "-and recognised it for the
foundation of all morality and religion. Eminently representative too is the letter written to her husband by Rahel Vamhagen,
their disciple, when the cholera was raging in Berlin: "What I
want is a death of my own. I won't die of an epidemic like
a blade of grass in a field, parched by malaria among its companions. I will die alone of my own disease--that's the kind of
woman I am."
As a result the whole history of their ideas is individual; it
is a part of their biography, not of the history of thought. In
this sense it is almost physiological, like their figures or their
faces. In spite of the liberty about which they were always
prating, they lay themselves under the very worst of tyranniesthe tyranny of self. Their intellectual and moral life was as
completely subdued to the accidents of their own persons as was
their digestion or bodily health. Their mental and ethical tone
was as exposed to the weaknesses and disorders of their own
temperaments and as helpless before them as was their physical
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tone to the weaknesses and disorders of their constitutions.
Tieck had romanticism just as he had rheumatism-as passively
and as unintentionally-however much he may have brooded
over it when he once came down with it. So it was that they
never succeeded in abstracting their thought-there is nothing universal or even general, impartial, and inevitable about their ideas.
In no respect, perhaps, is their egotism more strikingly shown
than in their attitude toward literature and art in general. As
litterateurs, ergo artists, at least in intention, they were so deeply
immersed in their own profession as to be incapable of seeing
anything else. Not only was it the one serious concern of life,
it was also the standard or norm of all other concerns whatever.
Even in Goethe the importance attached to resthetics strikes us
nowadays as rather naive, if not actually silly-at all events as
beside the mark. The kind of artistry which runs through
Wilhelm Meister as the sole preoccupation of every character of
any account and which indeed is the one touchstone of character,
is quite in the romantic vein and belongs to the same order of
things as the Sternbaldisieren with which Goethe himself reproaches Tieck. But though Goethe may have given a kind of
currency to the idea, it was reserved for the romanticists proper
to complete the confusion between art and morality, between the
conception of life as an accomplishment and as a duty. As for
so many other of our vices we are indebted to them too for the
disposition to "literatise" and "articise" life. Indeed, so far
did they carry the practice, so impotent were they to think outside of their own categories, so inflated with their own assumption
that they must needs make existence a play and God an artist
also because they, forsooth, were themselves second-rate literary
men. Even Schelling is so carried away with the draught created
by these ideas as to place resthetics above morals, to find the
consummation of philosophy in a work of art, and to justify
metaphysically the conception, which is represented even by
Schiller and Goethe, that the only complete man is the poet" die Poesie das Hochste und Letzte sei. " Heaven forfend! What
a world this would be if all of us were artists! But with this
conception, at all events, the distinction between philosophy and
poetry, between art and life is wiped out at one stroke; and
reality and fancy mingle in graceful phantasmagoria. ,. Was wir
Natur nennen ist ein Gedicht, das in geheimer, wunderbarer Schrift
verschlossen liegt. "
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Subdued as they were to the spell of their own being, they never
discovered in all their aspirations after freedom that the only
liberty is the liberty of self-restraint. They failed to perceive
that life was constantly spreading its snares to involve them in a
coil of fatal consequences, in a chain of determinations where their
independence would be irretrievably lost and they themselves
would become but creatures and slaves of circumstance. Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde is to all intents and purposes a panegyric
of sexual passion-or of love, as he preferred to call it. Its
thesis, as far as it can be said to have such a thing, consists with
the conviction that the realisation of liberty, of the infinite, das
Unendliche, is possible through the unbridled gratification of this
appetite alone. With pitiable short-sightedness he seems never
to have reflected that the moment he yielded to his passions, he
had become enmeshed in a network of influences over which he
had no control whatever, that he had committed himself to the
conditioned and given hostages to fortune. Only by an act of
self-control and denial, only by standing aloof and refraining
would it be possible to affirm his ego in withdrawing it from the
consequences of its activity.
"Von der Gewalt, die aIle Wesen bindet,
Befreit der Mensch sieh, der sieh uberwindet."

But consequences was the last thing they thought of; they were
totally devoid of discipline. And when they philosophised, they
were merely trying to talk themselves into believing what they
wished. Their freedom was the freedom to do as they liked;
their liberty, the liberty to indulge their own caprices.
Whether the romanticists consciously recognised the discrepancy between their profession of liberty and their actual
subjugation to self, it would be hard to say. In any case their
whole dialectic was directed to the problem of reconciling just
these two different notions; though it was only by a kind of
sophistry, in invalidating the authority of achieved distinctions,
that they succeeded in doing so. By obliterating the line of
demarcation between the outer and the inner order and reducing
the former to a tributary of the latter, by such means alone was it
possible to make it appear as though the gratification of impulse,
which makes man the slave of circumstance, was after all only
a sort of self-determinism. It was for this reason that they
welcomed with enthusiasm the philosophy of Fichte, which jus-
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tified their existence in representing the universe as the creation
of a glorified and transcendental ego. No doubt Fichteanism
was in the air, and it was of these cobwebs that Fichte spun it.
But it was as symptomatic of romanticism as acceptable to it.
For this reason their a ttitude toward nature becomes extremely
interesting. It was to nature that they resorted in the first
instance because her passivity had no embarrassments for their
self-esteem. They sought to her as they did to those of similar
mind with themselves. With her they could be themselves,
unrebuked and unabashed. They were rid of the clash of wills,
of the constraint of human intercourse, of the elementary decency
which compels even the most obstinate and wilful in society to
have some small regard for the rights of others, if for no better'
reason than a fear of the unpleasant consequences which result
from neglecting them. Before nature they could flaunt their
own personality as arrogantly as they pleased. Above all, they
might have of her the supreme satisfaction which the egotist
finds in the conviction that his influence is irresistible; they could
make her over in their own image so that she should bear their
very seal and impress. That they never saw her as she ispassionless, irrational, meaningless, a pure illusion-is clear
from their account of her. They saw her only as they were;
they discovered in her only what they brought to her. It is
after their example that we have learned to identify the moral
and the natural world. Cramped as they were by their own
limitations, they were incapable of conceiving another order
distinct and remote from that with which their own consciousness
acquainted them. Like N ovaHs they took nature to be the
"systematic index or plan of our spirit" just as we ourselves
are" Analogien-quellefiir das Weltall." And in that consciousness
of theirs they found little that was not sentimental. They had
no principles, no criticism-hardly a purpose; they were moved
by accident and caprice. Such is the sense of every word they
wrote. Heinrich von Ofterdingen falls in love with Mathilde
because he happens to feel, on seeing her, as he did in a dream
on seeing the little blue flower. It is circumstance alone which
determines them in one direction rather than another-circumstance and mood. And as they were themselves, so they
thought of nature-as of something equally moody, capricious,
and passionate. "Das grosse Weltgemiith" Novalis calls her.
It was a later and different tum of romantic thought which by
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an analogous error made her out a being essentially intellectual,
while by an inevitable reversal of the original confusion it is man
who has become a creature of nature's, a natural product. instead
of nature's being an achievement of consciousness, a sentimental
creation, a gigantic K unststilck or transcendental tour de forceor in N ovalis' words, "ein Universaltropus des Geistes. "
The volte-face is noteworthy. But after all the two attitudes
are only counterparts and are in reality so represented by Schelling, who finally gave a philosophical organisation to all these
indefinite ideas that were crossing in the air. "It is our view of
nature," he says, "not that it accidentally coincides with the laws
of consciousness . . . but that it necessarily and originally
realises as well as expresses those laws, and that it is nature and
is called so only in as far as it does this." It follows that" the
system of nature is at the same time the system of consciousness" ;
that" nature is visible mind and mind invisible nature. " While,
further, "nature thus appears as the counterpart of consciousness,
which consciousness itself produces in order to return thereby
to pure self-intuition or self-consciousness." "Hence in everything organic there is something symbolic, every plant bears some
feature of the soul." And he ends by transferring the whole
scheme of consciousness to external nature,using his metaphysical
principles to fill in the gaps in the positive knowledge of the
physical universe which existed in his day, exactly as Novalis
advises in the Lehrlinge zu Sais: "The careful description of the
history of this inner world of consciousness is the true history of
nature; through the consistency of the world of thought in itself
and its harmony with the universe is formed of itself a system of
ideas for the accurate representation and formulation of the
universe. "
At this point the confusion has culminated in the complete
identification of the law for man and the law for thing. Such is
the fallacy of the romantic conception of nature past and present:
with Schelling it offers man as the measure of nature, or else
with Renan it offers nature as the measure of man. How much
clearer, or at least how much less prejudicial is the Greek idea of
nature as of something in itself indifferent or inert, as a decoration
or accessory of voluntary action or a machine which it requires
intelligence to move! It is responsible for the whole marvellous
Greek mythology. Between the modem and his landscape there
ever swims a haze-the fume of his own distempered imagination.
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"Die W esen sind, well wir sie dachten.
1m truben Schimmer liegt die Welt,
Es fallt in ihre dunkeln Schachte
Ein Schimmer, den wir mit uns brachten. "

With Tieck he is like a man in a trance, a somnambulist in a limbo
between night and morning:
"It often happens that the world with all its tenants and occasions reels
before my eyes like a flimsy phantasmagoria.
And I too seem but an
accompanying phantom, which comes and goes and comports itself amazingly without knowing why. The streets look to me like rows of mimic
houses filled with silly occupants, who simulate human beings; and the
moonlight, shimmering pensively on the pavements, is like a light that shines
for other objects and has fallen upon this wretched and ridiculous world by
chance alone."

In this particular, it must be confessed, the hands of the roman-.
ticists were again strengthened by the example of Goethe, in
spite of his superior clarity of vision and his sterner sense of
actuality. For his own part he was never able to conceive of
nature, in the passive sense otherwise than as a work of art or
in the active sense otherwise than as an artist, for his pantheism
involved the one with the other. As such it must exhibit, on
the one hand, the same sort of design as any other artistic product, a poem or a statue; at the same time it must proceed, on
the other hand, in accordance with certain ideas similar to those
which determined his own work. His investigations of nature,
therefore, consisted in a series of attempts to explain that design
by penetrating to the ideas behind it. In other words, the universe was an artistic illusion, whose significance resided in the
motif which it realised-just as a novel is an illusion whose only
principle of coherence resides in the author's conception. Practically, therefore, since it was a mere mode of artistic expression,
the problem was to find the animating and creative ideas which
as artist it was trying to communicate. It never occurred to
him that it might be nothing more than a mechanical what-nota something which had fallen together and operated, not in
virtue of a set of ideas, but in accordance with a set of formulre,
that it might be something in and for itself, independent of
consciousness and without reference to it. Hence Schiller's
perfectly just objection to his Urpjlanze, "that is an idea, not a
fact." In short Goethe was, in reality, not scientific, but literary.
While art begins by assuming that nature is an illusion, science
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begins by assuming that it is a reality. While the former
endeavours to discover an idea that will give it significance, the
latter endeavours to discover a formula which will express the
manner in which it works. For this reason the mathematical
theory of light was simple nonsense to Goethe. It was not an
idea, a creative conception at all; it was a mere modus operandi.
On the other hand, in those cases where our organisation of the
universe is nothing more than the interpretations of the human
spirit-or in those sciences which consist largely in classification,
which are little more than arrangements of data, in accordance
with our own notions, and in which the generalisations are in a
sense only categories of the human intelligenc,e-in sciences like
botany and biology he was quite at home. But even there, notwithstanding his profounder divination, he was virtually at one
with the romanticists.
As a result of their exclusive and consistent egotism, when they
came to write, they had naturally nothing to write about but
themselves. That was all they knew, even if anything else had
happened to interest them, as it seldom did. With one or two
unimportant exceptions they had divorced themselves from all
the active and practical concerns of existence. At the one end
Tieck had disassociated poetry from life and reflection; at the
other Schleiermacher had disassociated religion from virtue and
morality-" everything with religion, nothing for it." Their
forms were almost devoid of content-in short, the form was the
content; hence the famous definition of transcendental poetry
as the poetry of poetry and their curious doctrine of second
powers or the multiplication of a subject into itself. The
French Revolution alone of all the stirring historical movements
. that were eddying around them seems to have roused them to a
faint flutter of excitement-mainly because they saw a way to
turn it over to the account of their own subjectivity. "The
French Revolution, Fichte's Theory of Knowledge, and Goethe's
Meister," declares Friedrich Schlegel, II are the greatest tendencies
of the century." In consequence their own novels are all autobiographies, revamped and redated, but cribbed, cabined, and
confined by the writers' own limited experience of themselves.
It is so with Sternbald and Heinrich von Ofterdingen, with Lucinde
and Hyperion. Indeed, this is Friedrich Schlegel's definition of
the romance-an individual confession. And it is equally so
even with their philosophies; of Schleiermacher's Monologen
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Haym remarks: "He talks as a man would do to his most intimate
friend." In a word, all their writings are personalities and
indiscretions.
It is only natural, therefore, that from the literary point of
. view their work should be as poverty-stricken as it is. But it was
not only so, it was muddled too. As they were puppets of mood,
without genuine character, all impressions were indifferent. Just
as their criticism was destitute of principles, so their creative
work, their Dichtung, was destitute of selection. What marked
it most conspicuously was the raw eclecticism which is the note of
romanticism everywhereL-a seated contempt fot the discriminations of a sane and disciplined taste. Hence a mishmash of
Inotives, costumes, cults, civilisations-Hellenism and Medirevalism, Paganism and Christianity-jumbled together in
inextricable medley. In this respect the elastic dream-economy
of Heinrich von Ofterdingen is remarkable and amply justifies by
its conveniency the M iirchen or fairy story as the romantic type
par excellence. All their Dichtung is essentially inchoate, as were
the two products which served them as paradigms-Goethe's
Meister and Tieck's Genoveva. And amid all this ferment and
clutter only one distinctly discernible purpose-the desire of
these young hotheads to reproduce the impressions made by life
upon their feverish and excited imaginations.
III
Evidently an existence of such unremitting self-exploitation
must have been extremely fitful and spasmodic. It must have
had its moments of exaltation, of reckless intoxication and
Rausch. But these moments must have been succeeded by
intervals of deSperate reaction and disillusion. Holderlin alone
is sufficient proof of it. As a result of this emotional insecurity,
no doubt, originated the doctrine of Transcendental Irony.
The title, ostentatious as it is, covers nothing more than an
attempt, on the part of Friedrich Schlegel in the first instance,
to pass off one's mortification at one's failings and shortcomings
by being the first to ridicule them when they were too conspicuous to escape general attention. It is a common enough shift
in every walk of life for those who are embarrassed by the discrepancy 15etween their pretensions and their performance to
make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating detraction and
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taking sides against themselves, to vindicate a kind of critical
or intellectual superiority over their own practical activities.
In such manner the romantic ego had at least the advantage of
appearing to know better than it could do and of restoring its
authority by a characteristically unprofessional intrusion or
supervention upon its own work. Like Victor Hugo's theory
of the grotesque the transcendental irony was a tacit confession
of the writer's powerlessness to produce a perfectly congruous and
satisfactory piece of work and an attempt to make a merit of
the fact by erecting his weakness into a quality. In other words
it was an effort to insure the romantic poet against the mediocrity of his own gifts. As Haym, who is usually so reserved in
his strictures, remarks in another connection: "This is perhaps
the most striking index of romantic poetry-that what is elsewhere an evidence of impotence and banality [Unpoesie] it construes as an indication of beauty and perfection."
From the point of view which has been gained at present it
is impossible to mistake the nature of the transcendental conception of self engaged in these speculations-as of something
distinct from all that is tangible, palpable, or in any way apprehensible or accountable. It is something quite noncommittal
and irresponsible. I t is uncompromised by a man's actions;
it is as evidently unprejudiced by his character; nor has it
apparently any manifestations by which you can bring it to book.
You can nbt comer it, try as you will. Whatever he is or does,
no matter how bete or fatuous or futile he may be, the romanticist
has only to reply to your censures: " Ah! you are quite mistaken;
that is not 1. See, I have quite as much contempt for that sort
of thing as you have." Verily, it was a dabster at evasion, this
transcendental self. In every instance it eludes you and by a
like expedient. It" dematerialises" like a "spirit" under your
very eyes and leaves you gaping foolishly at vacancy.
Upon morality the effect of such a doctrine was bound to be
fatal. This retirement of the real man from his character and
occupation provided a ready excuse for all sorts of irregularities,
which could be represented as merely impertinent to the genuine
self. By this means it was possible to excuse any atrocity as
transcendentally irrelevant and indifferent. And as a matter of
fact, the romanticist soon came to understand by morals nothing
more than the uses of human nature in its laxest and most
inclusive sense. The study of morality was the study of human-
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ity; and it was a consequence of his eclecticism that he embraced
in the term the animal as well as the spiritual, the earthy as well
as the ethereal. And since the ponderable, if once admitted,
is likely to weigh the heavier in the balance, it happened more
often than not that his morality was, in the ordinary acceptation
of the word, very immoral indeed. In fact, Schleiermacher
makes no bones about proclaiming "the immorality of all
morals. " While further, as humanity is infinitely various, it
will follow that there are as many moralities as there are human
beings. It is again Schleiermacher who with great complacency
makes the flattering discovery that the ego possesses a morality
as unique as its individuality. Perhaps Lucinde is as good a map
as we have of human nature after the romantic morality, where
humanity is likely to display itself very much as it is. But alas
for Schleiermacher, who went to the pains of defending it! it
is not only a nasty book, it is also a stupid one.
" Der Pedantismus bat die Phantasie
Urn einen Kuss; sie wies ibn an die SUnde.
Frech, ohne Kraft umarmt er die,
Und sie genas von einem toten Kinde,
Genannt Lucinde. "

And its viciousness as well as its stupidity, like that of the school
behind it, consists in its licentiousness, in the rejection of every
principle of restraint or control. The conception of obligation
as such seems never to have dawned upon this gentry. As
Goethe said of the Schlege1s, "Unhappily both brothers lack some
sort of inner check to hold them together an d keep them fast"
[" Leider mangelt es beiden Briidern an einem gewissen innern
Halt der sie zusammenhalte und festhalte "]. About their conduct there is always something shifty, unreliable, incalculableit is subject to a kind of aberration which seems to withdraw it
from the province of morals altogether and relegate it to that of
whim, caprice, and haphazard. It hardly belongs with the
rational and providential at all. It very nearly substantiates
their own claim of identity with nature.
I t is in this respect that German romanticism differs most
strikingly from New England transcendentalism. The parallelism between the two is too close and obvious to be overlooked.
To read Tieck is, in many cases, like reading Hawthorne translated into German, or vice versa. I am disconcerted by the
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similarity every time I reread them. Not only is there a resemblance of general tone and spirit between Hawthorne's sketches
and such stories of Tieck's in particular as the Blonde Eckbert and
the Runenberg; but there is also a resemblance of style and treatment, as is obvious from comparing the opening of The Great
Stone Face with that of Die Freunde or Die Elfen. And so likewise with N ovalis and Emerson there is in both the same characteristic sententious, fragmentary manner, the same brachylogy.
And what is so amazing, is that the scholars and literary historians
would have us believe that there was no direct discipleship on the
part of the Yankees. But however this may be, the leading
ideas of the two schools or movements were much the same;
their philosophy of life was, as a philosophy, identical. What
New England transcendentalism amounted to in the end, as we
have had a chance to see in this generation, was, like German
romanticism, the apotheosis of a purely ideal and sentimental
ego above character and conduct at large, and the arbitrary
elevation of the dicta of this ego into a code of morality.
To be sure, Emerson was himself a man of character and he
assumed the ego to be possessed of such character because he was.
But it was just the weakness of Emersonianism that in its adoption by others it was bound to take on the peculiarities of those
who adopted it-and they might have character, or more frequently, as it has turned out, they might not. In other words,
there was nothing in the original doctrine to guarantee or insure
character. And it is on this account that transcendentalism has
again become the philosophy of an age and a country in which the
general level of moral action is conspicuously low. It is just the
philosophy for a race and a generation with our notions of liberty
and self-interest-for a race and generation which wishes to be
free to defraud its neighbours in the morning and boast of its
moral elevation in the evening. It affords a sentimental refuge
for self-esteem in any emergency. It enables us in the handiest
way in the world to redeem the baseness of our practice by the
nobility of our sentiments. No matter how low our behaviour,
how contemptible our acts, our genuine self remains untouched.
Herein lies the explanation of the curious anomalies of our civil. isation--our unscrupulous and oppressive money-getting on the
one hand and our ostentatious and munificent benevolence on
the other; our sordid living and our grandiose dec1amationthe morose might call it hypocrisy; we call it idealism.
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To make Emerson and the romanticists responsible for all these
consequences seems at first thought unfair. In his own case
there is present one idea whose absence is thoroughly indicative
of the German transcendentalists as well as of contemporary
idealists. Emerson was still animated by a sense of duty.
Whether it was a survival of his descent or an independent acquirement of his own, the consciousness of responsibility and
guilt had not yet faded from his mind. Though. this conception
does not appear explicitly in his work, perhaps, it was implicit
in his character. It is virtually taken for granted, even though
it may never be mentioned; and it is in this particular that his
utterances have an immeasurable superiority over those of the
Germans. The transcendental idea of liberty had succeeded in
retrenching the categorical imperative altogether. Liberty consisted in following your own bent. Whatever gave the self range
and opportunity was moral. In short, morality was egotism.
Into this error Emerson never slipped. But it u!u.st be remembered that it was romanticism pure and simple that he preached;
and that in preaching it at all, he is justly accountable for the
results.
In other respects Hinduism, too, offers an edifying contrast
with transcendentalism. In one sense they were both systems of
the ego. While the latter, however, is optimistic, the former, on
the contrary, is pessimistic. It all lies in that. The note of romanticism is ec1ecticism-indifferency, promiscuity. The note
of Buddhism is discrimination, distinction, reservation. What
saves Buddhism, in short, is its dualism; that is, its freedom from
confusion. To the transcendentalist nature was but an extension of the ego; human nature was but" sister to the mountain "
and "second cousin to the worm"; the insensate was but an
alter ego of consciousness. To the Hindu nature was a derogation
to the genuine self. And with nature we must understand all
that part of human nature which was liable to "natural" law.
Hence liberty for the Buddhist lay in the self-restraint which
enabled him to withdraw more and more from the influence of
the fleeting, the impermanent, and the earthy until he should
emancipate himself wholly from the law for thing, the mechanical
determinations of a material cosmos, and ensue the higher and
spiritual, the true self. Whereas Hinduism would make religion
consist in a recognition of the distinction between the eternal
and the impermanent, the one and the many, and in an effort
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to establish the former; romanticism in the person of its evangelist, Schleiermacher, would find the infinite everywhere and in
everything and would swallow up both the one and the many in a
miscellaneous all. "The meditation of the pious is only an immediate consciousness of the universal, of all that is finite in
the infinite and through the infinite, of all that is temporal in
the eternal and through the eternal. To seek and find this
in everything that lives and moves, in all that grows and changes,
in all that acts and suffers, and to have and know life itself only in
immediate feeling as this being-this is religion." An illimitable diffusion, a boundless dissipation, an unceasing flux of sensation and emotion in which all distinction and definition melt
away in a shifty confusion-such is the last word of the romantic
religion as it is of the romantic ethics-endless dissolution.
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